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Battle of the Sexes

Coordination with asymmetric payoffs and correlated equilibrium emergence

Player 1 preferred payoff: 3

Player 2 preferred payoff: 3

Coordination bonus: 2

Population: 100

Learning Rate: 0.10

Signal Strength: 0.50

Player 1 (rows) vs Player 2 (cols):

	Option A	Option B
Option A	P1:3, P2:2	0, 0
Option B	0, 0	P1:2, P2:3

Round:0

P1 choosing A:0%

P2 choosing A:0%

Coordination Rate:0%

Current Equilibrium:None

P1-A

P1-B

P2-A

P2-B

About this simulation: Two players with different preferences must coordinate. Both prefer coordination over miscoordination, but each prefers their own favored option. Two pure Nash equilibria exist (both A or both B), plus a mixed equilibrium. With signals (external cues), a correlated equilibrium can emerge where players take turns. Watch strategies evolve through reinforcement learning.