Is something good because God commands it, or does God command it because it's good?
SOCRATES: "Consider this question: Is the pious loved by the gods
because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?"
EUTHYPHRO: "I do not understand what you mean, Socrates."
SOCRATES: "Then I shall try to explain more clearly..."
Things are good independently, and God recognizes and commands them because they are already good. Morality exists as an external standard that even God follows.
Things are good only because God commands them. There is no independent standard—God's will alone determines what is moral. (Divine Command Theory)
Morality has a real, objective basis that can be discovered through reason. "Thou shalt not murder" is true because murder is genuinely wrong.
God couldn't command torture for fun and make it good. Morality isn't subject to divine whim.
If morality is independent, God is bound by external standards. He becomes a "moral advisor" rather than the ultimate source.
Threatens OmnipotenceIf not God, what grounds morality? Platonic Forms? Natural law? This raises further metaphysical questions.
Explanatory GapGod is truly the ultimate authority. Nothing is above Him—He defines good and evil by His very nature and commands.
We have clear reason to obey: because the Creator commands it. Morality has definite source and authority.
Could God command murder, torture, or cruelty—and make them good? If He could, morality seems arbitrary and terrifying.
Moral HorrorSaying "God is good" becomes meaningless—it just means "God does what God commands," a tautology with no content.
Circular DefinitionGod neither conforms to nor invents the moral order. His very nature IS the standard of goodness. Morality flows from who God essentially is— not from arbitrary commands or external rules.
God and goodness are identical. There's no separation between God's nature and moral truth—they are one and the same thing. The dilemma presents a false dichotomy.
God is the supreme standard of morality and acts according to His necessarily good character. His commands aren't arbitrary because they flow from His unchanging nature.
God is necessarily loving and good—He couldn't command evil even in principle. The "what if God commanded murder?" scenario is metaphysically impossible, like a square circle.
The dialogue takes place in 399 BCE, just before Socrates' trial for impiety. He encounters Euthyphro, who is prosecuting his own father for murder— believing it's the pious thing to do.
The dilemma has been discussed for over 2,400 years and remains central to philosophy of religion and meta-ethics. It appears in:
Interestingly, Plato uses this dialogue partly to critique traditional Greek religion, where the gods often behaved immorally. The dilemma suggests their commands cannot be the ultimate source of goodness.